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 Reforming and building the capacities of Mali’s security and defence 
forces to provide security and maintain law and order is an essential 
element in re-establishing and consolidating peace throughout the 
country. However, such reform is linked to the peace process and spe-
cifically a peace agreement that will credibly meet the requirements 
and aspirations of the northern population. In light of repeated failures 
of past peace agreements to deliver, another agreement is now proving 
difficult to achieve. This paper examines challenges to arriving at such 
a peace agreement, and to the reform and governance of Mali’s armed 
and security forces. It suggests that if, or when, an agreement is 
reached, reform of the security sector must confront serious problems 
of corruption, politicisation, internal rivalries and divisions, lack of 
professionalism, depletion of equipment and resources, and inade-
quate civilian oversight and control. These institutional reforms and 
transformations in organizational culture must be undertaken in an 
extremely complex and shifting environment of overlapping conflicts 
and tensions at the regional (northern), national, and international 
levels, in which international state and non-state actors are engaged.  
 
  
 The 2012-13 crisis and the search 
for a peace agreement 
In January 2012 a Tuareg rebel group called the Mouvement nationale 
pour la libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) attacked the towns of Menaka, 
Tessalit and Aguel’hoc, setting off the fourth rebellion by nomadic Tua-
reg (or ‘Kel Tamashek’) in northern Mali since the country gained its 
independence from France in 1960. As with previous rebellions, that of 
2012 was a product of built up dissatisfaction and frustration with the 
deprivation and marginalization of the north, and unfulfilled promises 
made by Bamako to resolve earlier rebellions. But what distinguished 
the 2012 rebellion from its predecessors was the more radicalized and 
well-armed cohort of rebels, many returning from Libya where they had 
served in Gadafi’s army before the civil war which led to collapse of the 
Gadafi regime. Efforts to counter the rebellion in the north by the ill-
equipped Malian armed forces sparked a military coup d’état in the 
south that ousted President Adama Toumani Touré (popularly referred 
to as ATT). This was followed by the takeover of the majority of Mali’s 
northern territory by a loose coalition of jihadist groups linked to Al-
Qaeda and Tuareg rebels, and the imposition of Sharia (Islamic law) 
across the region. An apparent move by Islamist groups Ansar Dine and 
the Mouvement pour l’unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO) 
towards Bamako triggered the French-led military intervention ‘Serval’, 
in which French and Chadian troops ousted Islamist groups from the 
main towns in the north and restored Mali’s formal territorial integrity. 
A preliminary ceasefire agreement signed in Ougadougou in June 2013 
with rebel groups paved the way to democratic elections, which 
brought a new president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta (IBK) and legislature 
into office. Further international support and assistance arrived in the 
establishment of an AU mission, re-hatted as the UN Multidimensional 
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), alongside other 
capacity-building programmes including an EU training mission, bilat-
eral security assistance from key partners such as the US, and the 
French counterterrorism campaign ‘Barkane’, targeting cross-border 
jihadist movements in five countries of the Sahel including Mali.  
However several rounds of peace talks between the government and 
key rebel groups became deadlocked not only by fundamental differ-
ences among the parties regarding creation of a Malian federation, but 
by ambiguities and rivalry between various diplomatic initiatives led by 
MINUSMA, ECOWAS and the AU, and bilaterally by Algeria, the tradi-
tional mediator between Bamako and the Tuareg, Burkina Faso, the 
MNLA’s preferred choice as mediator, and Morocco. Despite these chal-
lengers, Algeria, has remained the key facilitator of the negotiations, 
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6 
even though it holds a significant bias against the creation of an inde-
pendent Azawad state due to the potential repercussions on the aspira-
tions of its own Tuareg population.1 An ill-advised visit in May 2014 of 
Prime Minister Moussa Mara to the northern town of Kidal, the bastion 
of Tuareg rebellion, resulted in an uprising and attacks by the MNLA 
and their subsequent routing of the Malian army from the city. The 
clashes in Kidal and the defeat of the Malian army had the effect of 
shifting the balance of power and underscoring the need for Bamako to 
seek a political solution, thus revitalizing negotiations.2  
However, peace talks between the government in Bamako and the 
northern rebel groups have faltered. The most recent round of talks in 
Algiers resulted in a preliminary Peace and Reconciliation Agreement 
in early March. The proposed agreement would recognize Azawad as a 
cultural space, would introduce devolution of powers, and the transfer 
of 30 % of government revenues to local authorities. Although ini-
tialled by Mali’s governmental representatives and the pro-Bamako 
rebel groups represented by the ‘Platform’3, the agreement was rejected 
by the ‘Coordination’ or CMA groups4 after consulting with their sup-
porters, on the grounds that it did not go far enough in granting auton-
omy to the Azawad region. Despite successive initiatives by interna-
tional actors including Algeria, individual members of the Permanent 
Five of the Security Council and the Security Council collectively to 
pressure the CMA to accept the agreement, the CMA has refused to en-
dorse the agreement of early March. For its part, the CMA reproached 
Algeria for locking in the text and for not allowing more direct discus-
sion between the CMA and GoM; expecting that an agreement could be 
pushed through and agreed by all sides, Algerian moderators had dom-
inated the talks and had scheduled only a few face-to-face meetings 
between the GoM and Tuareg rebel groups, which had proved insuffi-
                                                          
1 For more on Algeria’s role, see Andy Morgan, ‘Algeria plays a master’s game in north-
ern Mali’, 19 July 2012, http://www.andymorganwrites.com/algeria-plays-a-
masters-game-in-northern-mali/  
2  ICG, ‘Mali: Last Chance in Algiers’, Crisis Group Briefing No. 104, 18 November 
2014, p. 3.  
3  The Plateforme des mouvements d’autodéfense (Platform), which has come out in 
favour of national unity, is comprised of five large movements representing 32 fac-
tions in the north. The movements include: le Groupe Auto-Défense Touareg, 
Imaghad et Alliés (GATIA), Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad (MAA), la Convention Na-
tionale des Forces Patriotiques de Résistance (CNFPR), la Coalition pour le Peuple de 
l’Azawad (CPA- loyaliste) et le Mouvement Populaire pour le Salut de l’Azawad 
(MPSA). See Oumar Konate, ‘Mali: plateforme des mouvements d’autodéfense: “Il 
n’est pas question pour nous de compromettre l’unité nationale”’, maliactu.net, 15 
décembre 2014.  
4  The Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA) seeks autonomy for the north 
and is comprised of the following rebel groups: Mouvement national pour la libéra-
tion de l’Azawad (MNLA), Haut conseil pour l’unité de l’Azawad (HCUA), a dissident 
faction of the Mouvement arabe de l’Azawad (MAA), and the Coalition du peuple 
pour l’Azawad (CPA).  
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cient to break the deadlock and forge an agreement between the gov-
ernment and rebels.5 An initiative by the Algerian government to con-
vince the CMA to sign the Algiers preliminary agreement foundered on 
Algeria’s unwillingness to meet the CMA’s demand to include an 
amendment to the agreement.6 The main points that the CMA wants 
added to the accord include the official recognition of Azawad as a ‘ge-
ographical, political and juridical’ entity; creation of an inter-regional 
assembly that encompasses the Azawad zone; and an 80% quota in the 
security forces [in the region of Azawad] for “citizens” of Azawad’.7  
Moreover the peace negotiations, while enlarged over time to in-
clude more armed groups, did not include those armed groups with the 
strongest fighting capacities, which are also those least willing to com-
promise by accepting the principles of respect for Mali’s territorial in-
tegrity, national unity and the secular nature of the Malian state. The 
jihadi and extremist armed groups excluded from the peace process 
include al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for 
Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and Ansar ud-Dine.8  
Beyond the failure of the latest round of negotiation, the Malian 
state control of the north is nominal. Much of Mali’s territory north of 
the river Niger, and large parts of the districts of Kidal and Timbuktu 
today are not under de facto government control, as armed movements 
and jihadi groups are regaining control over the area. Triggered by the 
visit of Prime Minister Moussa Mara to Kidal, armed clashes broke out 
16-21 May 2014 between the MNLA supported by other groups and the 
Malian army, in violation of the ceasefire. The Malian armed forces re-
treated from Kidal and positions in the north. Another ceasefire, re-
sumption of the peace negotiations set out in the Ougadougou accord, 
and adoption of a roadmap for further negotiations with the two groups 
of armed actors, the Platform and the Coordination group then fol-
lowed, but with a hardening of position of the armed groups in favour 
of autonomy of the three northern regions of Mali. The security situa-
tion in the north has deteriorated since the May conflict, and inter-
factional clashes have also occurred increasingly, with violations of 
ceasefires agreed in Ougadougou, Kidal and Algiers as armed groups 
seek to expand their zone of influence and strengthen their positions in 
future rounds of negotiations. The result is a worsening humanitarian 
and human rights situation in the north, due to forced displacement 
                                                          
5  David Lewis and Emma Farge, ‘Hardline Mali rebel demands stall hopes for peace’, 
Reuters, 29 March 2015.  
6  ‘Mali rebels meet in Algiers to discuss rejected peace deal’, Reuters, 2 April 2015.  
7  ‘La rebellion exclut de parapher l’accord de paix “en l’état” malgré les pressions 
internationales’, L’Orient – Le Jour, 12 April 2015, 
http://malijet.com/actualte_dans_les_regions_du_mali/rebellion_au_nord_du_m
ali/127210-la-rebellion-exclut-de-parapher-l-accord-de-paix-en-l-etat-malgr.html, 
accessed 12 April 2015. Translation by author.  
8  Morten Boas, ‘The Algiers process – a step towards lasting peace in Mali?’, The 
Broker online, 20 April 2015.  
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and the withdrawal of civilian state personnel from the north since the 
May events in Kidal, affecting delivery of essential public services such 
as justice. The withdrawal of state prosecutors and judges from the 
north, for example, has resulted in widespread impunity for crimes. 
Continuing impunity can serve as a driver of retaliatory attacks.9 
Asymmetric attacks against UN peacekeepers and humanitarian work-
ers occur frequently and with lethal consequences, affecting delivery of 
humanitarian assistance and protection of civilians.10 Since its estab-
lishment in April 2013 MINUSMA has suffered 46 casualties,11 making 
it the UN’s deadliest peacekeeping mission. Furthermore, the March 
bombing by Islamists of a restaurant/bar in Bamako popular with ex-
pats threatens to mark the spread of violence to the south.  
Beyond these challenges posed by the deteriorating security situa-
tion and problems moving the peace process forward, there is growing 
dissatisfaction in Mali with the leadership of President Ibrahim Bou-
bacar Keita (IBK). A national public opinion poll,12 conducted two 
months after IBK took power in 2013, found that 79% of Malians over-
all (68% in Bamako) declared themselves satisfied with IBK’s leader-
ship and 86% had confidence in him to resolve the crisis in the north.13 
By early 2015, however, 53.7% of Bamako residents were dissatisfied 
with his leadership of the country, even if 60% had a positive image of 
him.14 Another poll demonstrated the drop in confidence in IBK in 
northern Mali. Compared to his immediate post-election results in 
which a strong majority of the northern population had confidence in 
him, by early 2015, more than 34% of people surveyed in northern 
Mali lacked confidence in IBK.15 This is linked to the resumption of 
violence, attacks, criminality, the continuing absence of the Malian 
state in the north and the inability of the authorities to find a solution 
to these problems. According to one Bamakois, the public has waited 
since IBK’s election for conditions in their daily lives to start improving. 
This has not happened, as all resources are currently focused on estab-
lishing security in the north. Moreover, while basing his campaign on 
                                                          
9  Suliman Baldo, Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Mali, 50th 
Meeting, 28th Regular Session of the Human Rights Council, 25 March 2015.  
10  Peter Dorrie, ‘The World’s Deadliest Peacekeeping Mission’, War is Boring, 15 Janu-
ary 2015, https://medium.com/war-is-boring/the-worlds-deadliest-peacekeeping-
mission-83459e5d5acf, accessed 31 March 2015. 
11  MINUSMA Facts and Figures, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/facts.shtml, accessed 
31 March 2015. 
12  The poll excluded Kidal due to security conditions at the time.  
13  ‘Selon un nouveau sondage du statistician Sidiki Guindo: 86% des Maliens ont 
encore confiance en IBK’, Journaldupeuple.com, 22 Novembre 2013.  
14  ‘Sondage d’opinion sur la gestion du pays: 53,7% ne sont pas plus satisfaits de la 
gestion du président’, Mali 24 Info, 17 février 2015.   
15  Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, Mali, Mali-Mètre: Enquĕte d’opinion: ‘Que pensent les 
Maliens?’ Numéro Spécial pour Gao, Kidal, Ménaka, janvier/février 2015, p. 16. 
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the honour of Mali and declaring himself against corruption during his 
electoral campaign, the President’s administration subsequently has 
been embroiled in corruption scandals, suggesting a continuation of 
business as usual rather than fresh start in Malian politics. According 
to another Malian observer, many Malians believe that the current gov-
ernment has failed to articulate a vision for the country. As the opti-
mism of the early post-election period has been chipped away, it be-
comes increasingly unlikely that IBK will be able to easily sell his elec-
torate on significant concessions that may be necessary to arrive at a 
peace agreement.  
 
 Preparing for disarmament, demo-
bilisation and reintegration (DDR) 
A peace agreement is a necessary first step to further reforms and de-
velopment initiatives in Mali. Once agreed and formally endorsed by 
the parties, planning and implementation of DDR, SSR, reconciliation 
and other elements of building a lasting peace can be undertaken. This 
section considers the requirements and challenges of implementing 
DDR. 
The downsizing or disbanding of armed forces and the reinsertion of 
former combatants into civilian life is part of the wider transition from 
conflict to peace. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 
(DDR)16 is relevant to both immediate stabilization and longer-term 
reconstruction and development of a post-conflict society. Consequent-
ly, according to the United Nations, ‘DDR must be integrated into the 
entire peace process from the peace negotiations through peacekeeping 
and follow-on peacebuilding activities.’17 Furthermore, according to 
OECD DAC, preparations for demobilization programmes including 
arrangements to fund them should begin even before a peace agree-
ment has been reached: ‘the knowledge that programmes have been 
put in place to assist demobilised combatants may …[help] to bring 
about the demobilisation agreement itself.’18 
DDR has been a key element of successive peace agreements and ef-
forts to resolve the periodic rebellions in northern Mali. However these 
past efforts have experienced numerous problems, including long de-
lays before implementation of reinsertion aspects of DDR programmes 
                                                          
16  MINUSMA’s website defines DDR in the following terms: ‘Disarmament concerns 
the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, 
explosives and light and heavy weapons, from all combatants and often from the 
civilian population.’ Demobilization is ‘the formal and controlled discharge of ac-
tive combatants from armed forces and groups, including a phase of “reinsertion” 
which provides short-term assistance to ex-combatants.’ Reintegration ‘is the pro-
cess by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employ-
ment and income. It is a political, social and economic process with an open time 
frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level.’ See ‘DDR’, MI-
NUSMA website, accessed 03 April 2015.  
17  ‘Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)’, MINUSMA website, ac-
cessed 03 April 2015.  
18  OECD, The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict, Part I (Paris: OECD, 
2001), p. 137.  
DDR and SSR Challenges in Mali 11 
owing to funding gaps,19 lack of consultation of local communities 
where reinsertion was to take place, clientelism and poor management 
of reinsertion programmes, and lack of oversight and accountability 
mechanisms for the programmes.20 Problems also attended efforts of 
previous DDR programmes to integrate former combatants into Mali’s 
security and defence forces. Members of the armed forces were dissatis-
fied in past efforts to integrate former combatants, who frequently de-
serted.21 According to some observers, Bamako’s use of DDR pro-
grammes as incentives to rebel groups to agree to a peace agreement 
has, in the persistently challenging economic context of northern Mali, 
had the perverse effect of encouraging Tuareg civilians to join rebel 
militias in order to benefit from anticipated post-conflict DDR pro-
grammes.22  
Following the rebellion of 2012, DDR was addressed from the earli-
est efforts in conflict management. According to the Ouagadougou Ac-
cord of June 2012, the interim Malian government and two signatory 
Tuareg armed groups23 agreed to a ceasefire and that negotiations for a 
comprehensive peace agreement would start 60 days after a newly 
elected government took office. DDR was also part of the Accord, the 
first step of which would be the cantonment of the signatory armed 
groups. With the declaration of the ceasefire, the signatory armed 
groups agree to proceed with the cantonment of their forces under su-
pervision of and with support from MISMA/MINUSMA, although dis-
armament and demobilization would only be completed after the sign-
ing of a comprehensive peace agreement.24 The agreement to a can-
tonment process within the Ougadougou Accord was a compromise 
between the Malian government, which originally sought to have the 
                                                          
19  For example, the first programme to reintegrate former combatants into Malian 
society that was linked to the 1992 National Pact did not receive full funding until 
three years following the agreement. See Baz Lecocq, Disputed Desert: Decolonisa-
tion, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in Northern Mali (Brill, 2010), 
pp. 272-273. 
20  ‘Programme et perspectives DDR au Mali’, Presentation to the seminar Désarme-
ment, Démobilisation et Réintégration des Ex-combattants: expérience de la Côte 
d’Ivoire: bilan, enjeux et perspectives, organised by the DDR Authority (ADDR), UN 
Mission in Cote d’Ivoire and UNDP, Abidjan and Boake, 4-5 November 2014. 
http://www.addr.ci/down/DDR%20PRESENTATION%20A%20ABIDJAN%20EN%20N
OVEMBRE%20%202014.pdf, accessed 4 April 2015.  
21  International Crisis Group, ‘Mali: Last Chance in Algiers’, Africa Briefing No. 104, 18 
November 2014, pp. 7-8.  
22  ‘Despite low mass killing risks, likelihood of new conflict in Mali increase as peace 
talks falter’, Early Warning Project, 2 April 2015. 
http://www.earlywarningproject.com/2015/04/02/despite-low-mass-killing-risks-
likelihood-of-new-conflict-in-mali-increase-as-peace-talks-falter, accessed 3 April 
2015.  
23  The Mouvement nationale de libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) and the Haut Conseil 
pour l’unité de l’Azawad (HCUA).  
24  See Articles 6, 11, 21, Accord Préliminaire à l’Eléction Présidentielle et aux Pourpar-
lers Inclusifs de Paix au Mali, signed in Ouagadougou, 18 June 2013. 
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rebel groups disarm before entering into peace talks, and the armed 
groups who were wary of disarming and weakening their bargaining 
position in subsequent peace talks.25  
A ‘Joint Technical Commission on Security’ (Commission Technique 
Mixte de la Sécurité) under the supervision of the MINUSMA Force 
Commander was established to oversee all technical aspects of the DDR 
process, and involves both national and international stakeholders. In 
February 2014, armed groups agreed on the criteria for eligibility for 
cantonment.26 In this pre-cantonment phase, potential cantonment 
sites were being identified, with each of the armed groups designating 
three priority sites. It fell to the government in Bamako to raise the fi-
nancing for the eventual cantonment sites. These early preparations 
were brought to a halt, however, following the clashes between armed 
groups and the military that resulted in May 2014 after the arrival of 
the prime minister in Kidal. The DDR process subsequently collapsed, 
as armed groups refused to resume cantonment until a final peace 
agreement is signed.27  
Cantonment, or encampment, refers to the gathering of former com-
batants in special camps where they can be registered and turn in their 
weapons and uniforms before being discharged or demobilized from 
their units. This stage is aimed at building confidence between the par-
ties to the conflict that each side will abide by the terms of the peace 
agreement. The cantonment process also provides essential data on the 
numbers, skill profiles and career aspirations of former combatants to 
inform development of programmes for either their recruitment into an 
armed force or reintegration into the civilian economy.28 Cantonment is 
best undertaken as a step leading to an effective DDR process before a 
peace agreement takes effect. Until a peace agreement is signed, many 
armed groups and militias and self-defense groups in the north are like-
ly to continue seeking young recruits, with the promise of eventual 
inclusion in the DDR process and therefore access to the resources and 
training it will confer on combatants as they are demobilized. However 
DDR resources are finite, and the more people are signed up as mem-
bers of armed groups to undergo DDR, the less effective the existing 
funds will be.29  
                                                          
25  Ibrahim Maiga, ‘Mali: Is Cantonment the Key to Success in Mali’s Negotiations?’ 
Institute for Security Studies, 21 July 2014.  
26  ‘Processus de DDR: Des pistes prometteuses’, Malijet, 17 February 2014, 
http://malijet.com/actualte_dans_les_regions_du_mali/rebellion_au_nord_du_m
ali/93662-processus-de-ddr-des-pistes-prometteuses.html, accessed 23 February 
2015.  
27  Confidential interview, Bamako, 25 February 2015.  
28  See OECD, Helping Prevent Violent Conflict, p. 138. 
29  Confidential interview, Bamako, 25 February 2015.  
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If and when a peace agreement is endorsed by all parties, another 
challenge will be in constituting the national DDR commission. This 
body cannot only reflect decisions made by Bamako alone, but needs to 
be inclusive of all parties. Further, identifying the appropriate individ-
ual to head the commission is also important; ideally that person 
should be more a technical expert than a political appointee, or s/he 
will likely have difficulties executing the commission’s mandate. The 
DDR process will need to take into account combatants, militias, auto-
defense groups, as well as people with special needs, women, and 
those requiring psycho-social support. This too will have financial im-
plications.   
A further challenge will be posed by the determination of who 
among the various armed groups is to be demobilized and reinserted 
into the civilian economy, and who will be integrated into the Malian 
security forces. While the Malian government was reported to have 
been opposed to further reintegration of ex-combatants during earlier 
rounds of negotiations, this changed following the events of May and 
the preference for many groups to have their members inside the secu-
rity forces. Previous reintegration initiatives also addressed only Tua-
reg rebels and efforts were focused only on the north. A challenge for 
the DDR process once a peace agreement is reached, then, will be the 
criteria for being part of the reintegration process.30  
A critical component of a reintegration process will be human rights 
vetting of potential candidates for reintegration. Vetting is a formal 
procedure to identify individuals responsible for abuses; in the context 
of DDR, vetting would be used to identify individuals who are ineligible 
for recruitment in the state’s armed and security forces on the grounds 
of their past behaviour of abuse. According to a recent UN report, over 
the course of 2014 both the opposition armed movements and Malian 
armed forces have committed human rights violations. Armed groups 
in Mali’s north have been involved in continuing violations of the right 
to life, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and have carried out 
abductions, unlawful detention, recruitment and use of children in 
armed conflict, asymmetrical attacks and looting.31 (Members of the 
Malian army were also responsible for human rights violations involv-
ing the right to life and physical integrity, and cruel, inhuman or de-
meaning treatment. The Malian military were implicated in a wave of 
rapes against minors in the wake of the Kidal clashes in May.32) In late 
2014 human rights groups criticized the draft peace agreement for 
omitting to mention vetting in the context of DDR, and demanded that 
an independent vetting commission be established to screen potential 
                                                          
30  Confidential interview, Bamako, 25 February 2015. 
31  Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human 
rights in Mali’, A/HRC/28/83, 9 January 2015, paras. 64-76.  
32  Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human 
rights in Mali’, A/HRC/28/83, 9 January 2015, paras. 54-63.  
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new members of the security forces and remove existing members who 
have been involved in serious human rights violations during the con-
flict. According to discussions with relevant authorities in Bamako sub-
sequently, members of armed groups who are cantoned as part of the 
DDR process, in particular those considered for integration into the 
Malian armed forces or security services, would likely be subject to a 
vetting process coordinated by the Human Rights section of MINUSMA 
and the OHCHR.33  
Other observers from Malian civil society maintain that both the 
armed forces and Malian public opinion continue to resist the idea of 
reintegration of rebel forces into Malian army and security institutions, 
as several past efforts of reintegration have failed. This is backed up by 
public opinion polls which saw 74.6% of respondents across Mali in 
2014 agree that forthcoming peace negotiations needed to address the 
disarmament of armed rebel groups, while only 10% considered inte-
gration of rebels into the armed forces to be a priority, and even fewer, 
5%, considered their integration into the public service an issue to be 
raised in negotiations.34 Preferential practices in the past efforts often 
awarded good posts with high salaries to reintegrated members of 
armed groups even when these lacked the appropriate qualifications or 
educational background, fostering resentment among other members 
of the military. Past experience also saw many reintegrated during the 
2002 crisis, around one thousand reintegrated members of former rebel 
groups left the Malian army, taking their weapons with them, with 
many rejoining the rebellion.35  
Mali’s three previous experiences with DDR have provided valuable 
insights on possible pitfalls for future DDR. These include problems 
with the mismanagement of funds, clientelism in the choosing of bene-
ficiaries, and lack of sufficient follow-up and reinforcement of capaci-
ties of those who had gone through the DDR process. The next DDR 
process will need to address these, through adequate financial moni-
toring, clear eligibility criteria for participants in the DDR process as 
well as clear criteria for those reintegrated combatants who are sent to 
military academy or officer training, and adequate follow-up arrange-
ments. The next DDR process will also need to have procedures for 
leaders of armed groups who are not eligible for DDR inclusion (be-
cause of human rights violations, for example), jihadists (at the level of 
the ‘foot soldier’) and repatriation of foreign combatants. 
                                                          
33  ‘Programme et perspectives DDR au Mali’, November 2014; also confidential inter-
view, Bamako, 25 February 2015.  
34  Mali-Mètre, 2014, p. 85.  
35  Confidential interview, Bamako, 26 February 2015.  
 Security sector reform (SSR) 
While planning for certain aspects of DDR – namely demobilization 
and disarmament – ideally begins in advance of a peace accord among 
the parties to a conflict for implementation once agreement is achieved, 
other elements such as reintegration into state security institutions 
require a longer-term perspective and segue into planning for SSR. SSR 
affects core state institutions in the justice and security spheres as well 
as arrangements for their governance and oversight, and may take 
years or decades to fully implement. The often profound implications of 
SSR for delivery of core services by the modern state require, not least, 
a broader and deeper consultative process. In the case of Mali, SSR 
should also be built on a thorough understanding of precisely how past 
practices created the conditions that led to military coup, the routing of 
the Malian security and defence forces that almost resulted in the loss 
of the majority of its territory to jihadist groups. This section sets out 
potential priority issues for SSR, based on recent events, potential con-
straints and opportunities for SSR, and the preliminary steps being 
taken to initiate an SSR process in Mali.  
The need for comprehensive security sector reform in Mali is sug-
gested most vividly by the military coup and its aftermath, which re-
flected long-standing dysfunctions within Mali’s armed forces.36 On 21 
March 2012 a military protest against the government for sending ill-
equipped soldiers to quell the new northern rebellion was initiated by 
soldiers based at Kati camp near Bamako and led by Captain Amadou 
Sanogo. This rapidly transformed into a coup d’état on 22 March 2012, 
and the establishment of the military junta by the ‘green berets’ (sol-
diers loyal to Sanogo). An attempted ‘counter-coup’ on 30 April 2012 
was initiated by the ‘red berets’ -- the 33rd regiment of paratroopers 
who also functioned as the Presidential Guard, loyal to the overthrown 
president ATT, who was himself a former paratrooper commander. Re-
taliatory actions taken by green berets against the red berets included 
detentions and disappearances, the ransacking of their camp and deni-
al of salaries and provisions for the red berets and their families.37 Offi-
cially disbanded, the majority of the 1200 red beret airborne units re-
sisted an attempt by the government of interim President Diacounda 
Traoré38 to reassign them to different units for deployment to the north 
                                                          
36  Morten Boas and Liv Elin Torheim, ‘Mali unmasked: resistance, collusion, collabo-
ration’, NOREF Report, March 2013, p. 3.  
37  Baba Ahmed, ‘Mali: Une armée toujours minée par les divisions’, Jeune Afrique, 27 
September 2012.  
38  On 12 April 2012 the junta agreed to a return to civilian rule and Diacounda Traoré 
was brought in as interim President. In May soldiers responsible for guarding him 
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and remained cantoned at their regimental headquarters in Bamako. 
These were again attacked in their camp by other Malian security forces 
in early 2013.39 In late 2013, based on testimonies of members of 
Sanogo’s military junta who were being prosecuted, a mass grave was 
discovered containing the bodies of 21 red berets who, loyal to ATT and 
linked to the counter-coup, had been executed by Sanogo’s associ-
ates.40 The internal fractures and fratricidal dynamics extended even 
further, as revealed following an attempted mutiny by a group of sol-
diers who originally supported Sanogo’s military junta, which similarly 
resulted in disappearances of several implicated green berets and the 
subsequent discovery months later that they had been executed.41 
As indicated by the 2012 coup and the political factions within the 
armed forces, creating non-partisan military and security institutions 
that uphold the constitutional order will be a necessary element of SSR 
in Mali. The military needs to be strengthened within the framework of 
a republican army (armée républicaine), that is, as a professional, dis-
ciplined army who serve the nation and are subject to democratic civil-
ian authority and oversight. The chain of command of the Malian 
armed forces was described by several respondents as being particular-
ly dysfunctional due to lack of discipline and of respect for hierarchical 
authority. As noted above, recruitment and promotion practices were 
perceived to be rife with nepotism and favouritism, and likely contrib-
uted to the sense of a lack of professionalism within the armed forces. 
One recently retired Malian army officer has further attributed erosion 
of discipline to the introduction of trade unions into the armed forces.42  
After Mali’s revolution in 1991 and the transition from dictatorship 
to multiparty system, the army was intended to be a professional one, 
serving the nation while operating under democratic civilian control. 
Yet, although a code of conduct produced in 1997 speaks to several 
ideals of military professionalism, it says little about democratic civil-
ian control, transparency and accountability.43 As noted by a Malian 
                                                          
allowed him to be badly beaten by protesters supporting the military junta. ‘Malian 
army lets angry demonstrators beat up President’, London Evening Post, 22 May 
2012.   
39  ‘Mali: Au moins deux morts dans des combats au camp militaire de Djicoroni, à 
Bamako’, Jeune Afrique, 08 February 2013.  
40  ‘Bérets rouges tués au Mali: un charnier découvert près de Kati’, Radio France In-
ternationale, 04 December 2013.  
41  Marc-Andre Boisvert, ‘Waiting for justice for Mali’s missing soldiers’, Inter Press 
Service, 13 February 2014; and ‘Mali: discovery of six soldiers’ bodies near Kati 
sparks need for initiation of proceedings regarding mutiny of 30 September 2013’, 
4 March 2013, https://www.fidh.org/International-Federation-for-Human-
Rights/Africa/mali/14895-mali-discovery-of-six-soldiers-bodies-near-kati-sparks-
need-for-initiation, accessed 06 April 2015.  
42  Confidential interview, Accra, 6 March 2015.  
43  See Code de Conduite des Forces Armées et de Sécurité du Mali, 1/10/1997. 
http://www.resdal.org/Archivo/d000000c.htm, last accessed 10 April 2015. Com-
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member of civil society, even if the army is ‘la grande muette’ (works 
quietly behind the scenes),44 and occupies a special position in Malian 
society, it is necessary for the political class and public to understand 
what is going on in the army.45 As noted by members of Mali’s political 
parties and civil society, there is a lack of public debate on national 
defence issues, lack of a formal defence policy and personnel planning 
in the army, and an inadequate oversight role played by the legislature 
with regard to the implementation of defence policy.46  
From having one of the most powerful militaries in the region at the 
beginning of the 1990s, by the time the coup occurred, the Malian ar-
my was under-equipped, functioned at a very basic level, and was in-
capable of protecting Mali’s citizens and territorial sovereignty. Within 
the armed forces, corruption and nepotism afflicted all levels of the 
armed forces, lack of discipline within the armed forces, and a top-
heavy structure due to an excessive number of senior officers. Mali’s 
army had been weakened over the years by several factors, not least the 
effects of systematic corruption. Recruitment into the army was often 
secured through bribes, while promotions were frequently determined 
not on the grounds of merit but by nepotism and favouritism. This in-
cluded promotion to the rank of generals, who included many associ-
ates of ATT, and whose high levels of compensation eroded the military 
budget.47 The majority ethnic groups of southern Mali -- i.e. the Bamba-
ra, Soninke and Malinke – were overrepresented in the Malian security 
forces, while minority ethnic groups, in particular the northern Tuareg, 
Maure, Songhai and Peul, were underrepresented.48 Corruption was 
also alleged through the complicity or collusion of members of the state 
administration, political class and military officers with smuggling, 
including in several notorious cases of cocaine air shipments landing in 
northern Mali, kidnappings for ransom by Jihadist groups in the north, 
                                                          
pare with suggested principles in Adedeji Ebo, ‘Vers un code de conduit pour les 
forces armées et de sécurité en Afrique: occasions et défis’, DCAF, Geneva, March 
2005.   
44  ‘La grande muette’ originated as a term for the French army before 1945, owing to 
restrictions imposed at that time on the individual freedoms of active service-
members (that is, they were denied the right to vote, freedom of assembly, and 
freedom of expression). The army was held to be the silent, apolitical instrument of 
the executive. See Larousse Dictionary online, entry for ‘muette: la grande muette’. 
http://www.larousse.fr/dictionnaires/francais/muette/53108, accessed 11 April 
2015.  
45  Confidential interview, Bamako, 24 February 2015.  
46  For example, see ‘Pour rendre plus efficace le système de défense du Mali’, 
L’Indépendent, 01 September 2014, http://www.maliweb.net/politique/rendre-
efficace-systeme-defense-du-mali-ladema-association-propose-demobilisation-
officiers-soldats-inaptes-fonction-militaire-500882.html, accessed 05 April 2015.  
47  Stephen A. Harmon, Terror and Insurgency in the Sahara-Sahel Region: Corruption, 
Contraband, Jihad and the Mali War of 2012-2013 (London: Ashgate, 2014), pp. 91-
93.  
48  Festus Kofi Aubyn, ‘Policing and Peace Operations in Africa: Reflections on MI-
NUSMA’, KAIPTC Occasional Paper No. 39 (March 2015), p. 15.  
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and illicit arms sales to such groups.49 This complicity of state officials 
and some military and security officers was also linked to Bamako’s 
stance vis-à-vis AQIM’s activities in the north until mid-2011, which 
was likened by critics to that of an ‘ostrich’.50 
The weakening of Malian army has also been credited to the deple-
tion over the years of its weapons and equipment. This depletion oc-
curred both through diversion of funds and through deliberate policies 
of successive presidents Konaré and ATT that prioritized development 
over defence procurement. This long-term hollowing out of the army 
resulted in a lack of logistical assets that could have enabled the resup-
ply of northern garrisons and more effective defence against the MNLA 
attacks in 2012.51 
Moreover, many Malian soldiers were said to be reluctant to be de-
ployed to the north in response to the recurrent northern rebellions, 
due to the harsh conditions of desert warfare, daunting geography and 
complex security dynamics.52 Lack of adequate equipment exacerbated 
the challenges for Malian soldiers. In early 2012 in Aguelhoc, 150 Ma-
lian soldiers were killed in an attack by armed groups while lacking 
food and ammunition. The coup was spurred by outrage within the 
military at the harsh conditions faced by personnel deployed to the 
north to counter the Tuareg rebellion. Several interviewees in Bamako 
noted a sense of public sympathy for the military, whose members were 
perceived to have been abandoned without adequate training or 
equipment to the hostile environment in the north.53 
Issues of professionalism are also raised by some with regard to past 
efforts at integrating former rebels into the military and security forces. 
Some Tuareg who had gone through integration in the military or other 
security institutions in past DDR programmes felt in the past that they 
were not benefiting from promotions and were being discriminated 
against. This seemed to result in a subsequent integration in pro-
nounced efforts to promote integrated former combatants. However 
appointment of integrated former combatants to positions for which 
they lacked the necessary background fostered resentment among oth-
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er military, as did the desertion from the army by many of the former 
rebels when new rebellions broke out.54 Planning for DDR, and espe-
cially reintegration initiatives, must take these past experiences into 
account while striving to build a cohesive and inclusive Malian security 
sector.  
SSR is needed to strengthen capacities of security services to protect 
the territorial integrity of the Malian state and to protect the Malian 
population from threats, including populations in the northern part of 
the country. A new military law – the Loi d’orientation et de program-
mation militaire (LOPM) – was passed in February. The law is guided by 
three objectives: the profound reform of the armed forces to reflect 
changes in its environment; providing adequate human resources to 
enable the armed forces to defend the country’s population and territo-
ry in line with a national security doctrine. The law allocates over 20 % 
of the national budget, or 1230 billion West African CFA francs (the 
equivalent of 1.8 billion Euro), to building up the security sector and 
strengthening defence capacities over the next five years. Mali’s armed 
forces currently number 31,000 and are estimated to require 20,000 
more to reinforce its capacities in the north. According to the LOPM, 
10,000 new personnel will be recruited, while military equipment will 
be updated, and living and working conditions will be significantly 
improved. It also aims to improve the training, equipment, manage-
ment system and governance of the armed forces.55 
According to Malian observers, the country’s military and security 
personnel must be better able to do their jobs – a matter of having the 
correct laws in place but also of having effective recruitment, training, 
career path management, professionalization and equipment. Mali has 
high levels of unemployment, and youth especially lack employment 
opportunities. Local observers note that there have been no efforts to 
portray a positive image of the army to youth, and many of those who 
join the army do so because of the lack of alternative livelihood oppor-
tunities. This however affects quality and operational effectiveness and 
is reflected in high rates of desertion, weak combat skills, etc. The re-
cruitment process is also considered to have been mismanaged; instead 
of recruiting on merit, recruiting problematic (delinquent) youth to the 
army was perceived in Malian society over many years as a means of 
disciplining them, which further weakened professionalism in the 
armed forces and security forces.  
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Another SSR challenge is related to the management of public goods 
in Mali, which has been affected by their use as a resource in local 
power and politics as a result of Mali’s patrimonial or patron/client 
relationships. This includes the public goods of safety, security and 
justice, but extends to include others such as education and sanitation 
services. Mali faces a huge challenge in reforming the key state security 
institutions, including ensuring their good governance and introducing 
more effective checks and balances in their management and oversight, 
and better use of resources.  
While the 2012 coup and subsequent crisis underscored the need 
for democratic civilian control of the armed forces, this has remained 
limited so far to executive control and formal oversight by the legisla-
ture. According to civil society actors, the military appears to be still 
not convinced of the role that civil society can play in democratic con-
trol, including the idea of security institutions that are inclusive and 
responsive to the needs of citizens. Others perceive the problem more 
on the side of civil society involvement in monitoring of the reform pro-
cess, which was not done or not done appropriately, involving in some 
cases CSOs that were politicized or led by people from the political are-
na.56 The crisis of 2012 has nevertheless served to spur NGOs and CSO 
activities in public dialogue around reform issues, which can help indi-
rectly their function as watchdogs.57  
It is also noteworthy that while Mali’s political elite may acknow-
ledge to donors and international partners that trafficking is a problem 
in Mali, this is not necessarily the case with the general public. Accord-
ing to a Bamako-based governance expert, the issue of trafficking has 
not entered national debate, nor is it perceived to be a national priority. 
Rather, this is perceived as a livelihoods issue in the northern region 
where the state is almost completely absent and where there are few 
alternative means of survival. This attitude towards drug trafficking in 
particular stands in stark contrast to the attention that international 
actors have focused on it. In contrast, to some extent international ter-
rorism is seen as a matter of concern among the general public, but is 
seen by some as being motivated primarily by the race for natural re-
sources, or not as important as what is needed to achieve a certain level 
of security and development in the country. As noted by one respond-
ent: ‘The international community is waving the flag of jihadism and 
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international terrorism. Is it really in our interests to get engaged in 
that process? It may affect our security and development.’58  
Other elements of Mali’s security and justice sector similarly require 
attention. Mali’s main law enforcement institutions are the national 
police, responsible for law enforcement and maintaining order in urban 
areas, while the paramilitary gendarmerie are responsible for rural are-
as. Both national police and gendarmerie fall under the Ministry of In-
ternal Security and Civil Protection, and are generally believed to have 
remained under effective control of civilian authorities.59 However, the 
police has also witnessed internal divisions, namely rival factions with-
in the Mobile Security Group (Groupement Mobile de Sécurité or GMS) 
that engaged in clashes in September 2012 amid accusations that one 
faction, heavily armed in violation of Malian law, supported the former 
military junta and as a result received preferential treatment including 
special perks and unmerited promotions from interim President Di-
oncounda Traoré.60 The promotions were subsequently revoked by 
Traoré. Nevertheless the ‘police war’ continued in November 2012 
when several police commissioners were abducted by hooded men in 
police vehicles and held in a GMS camp in Bamako, which also houses 
the headquarters of a police trade union. They were released only after 
an appeal made by the High Islamic Council of Mali to their captors. 
The abduction was ascribed to police union leaders, who presented 
demands on behalf of their members.61 On 6 April 2013 a group of 
armed and security forces, led by a gendarmerie officer, intervened to 
disarm the heavily armed faction, a two-hour operation that resulted in 
the death of one soldier and the arrests of several police officers.62 Pro-
putschist police in the GMS, along with certain members of the military 
and national guard, were also implicated in the torture of individuals 
opposing the coup.63 Just as it seemed that the internal `police war` 
had been resolved, the issue of promotions surfaced again in 2014 with 
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the signing of a decree by IBK that promoted a cohort of younger offic-
ers who were recruited in 2008 and 2009 over those recruited during 
the five preceding years. Buckling at the idea of younger officers hold-
ing command positions over their elders, the issue again threatened to 
create divisions within the police.64  
The Malian police are poorly trained and lack the necessary equip-
ment and resources to fulfil their functions effectively.65 Public opinion 
in Mali shows low levels of confidence in police. According to inter-
views conducted with civil society representatives in Bamako, the na-
tional police are held in low regard in public opinion for preying on the 
public by imposing ‘fees’ and soliciting bribes, particularly those offic-
ers involved in traffic control.66 According to interviewees, there is a 
strong perception among members of the public that a significant 
number of individuals who join the police, or who purchase positions 
in the police for their children, do so as a long-term investment to sup-
plement their official salary. The lack of confidence in police is reflect-
ed in public opinion polls. A 2014 national poll (but excluding the 
north) found that Malians consider the police as the public service that 
is second most poorly governed and corrupt (the justice sector held first 
place for bad governance).67 In a 2015 poll focused on the north of 
Mali, 67% of respondents in Kidal expressed confidence in the police to 
provide security in their environment, whereas only 33% in Gao and 
29.8% in Menaka declared to have confidence in the police.68 Nepo-
tism is also perceived as the main factor influencing police budgets and 
promotions.69 The gendarmerie, which are the paramilitary rural po-
lice, are viewed in the south in a more positive light than the national 
police and are considered less corrupt.70 However the gendarmerie are 
viewed in worse terms than the police in the eyes of the public in the 
north, with 92.6% in Kidal and 65% in Gao expressing little or no con-
fidence in them for local security.71  
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The police reflected their colonial heritage until the early 1990s, 
when were demilitarised during the democratisation and national con-
ference process of 1992. Since the events of 2012, some Malians have 
supported the remilitarisation of the police. In part this was a reaction 
to violent clashes between rival police unions. Remilitarisation has also 
been seen by some as a means to include police in joint battle groups 
(groupements tactiques interarmes or GTIA) that carry out securitisation 
and pacification activities in northern Mali, thus filling the gap in the 
security forces left by some 3000 integrated rebels who abandoned the 
army with the resumption of conflict.72 Indicative of the sensitivity of 
the issue of integration in the south, police unions have also protested 
the promotion of individuals who had supported the coup (presumably 
integrated personnel from earlier rebellions), and were successful inso-
far as those promotions were cancelled.73 During the clashes in Kidal in 
May 2014, 36 policemen belonging to the mobile security group were 
killed while accompanying Prime Minister Moussa Mara on his visit to 
the town. Anger arose within the police ranks and the police union pro-
tested against the Director General of the National Police for having 
sent unarmed police into a volatile area, and accused him of incompe-
tence and favouritism in his management of the police, moreover fail-
ing to ensure that police officers are paid their salaries on time.74  
Mali faces further challenges in the delivery of formal justice ser-
vices to its population. This is particularly needed in the north, which 
was governed for 9 months by armed groups under a regime of Sharia 
law. During the armed conflict of 2012-13 human rights organisations 
documented there many serious violations of international humanitari-
an law by both sides to the conflict, including summary executions, 
forced disappearances, torture, forced amputations, looting, pillage, 
sexual violence, recruitment and use of child soldiers and destruction 
of cultural property. According to Human Rights Watch, past peace 
agreements failed to adequately address human rights violations com-
mitted during periods of unrest or even included provisions for immun-
ity from prosecution. Following the Ouagadougou Accord in June 2013 
and in the lead-up to the current round of peace negotiations, certain 
commanders and members of armed groups were released as confi-
dence-building measures, despite apparent involvement of some of 
those individuals in serious crimes during the conflict. Subsequently, 
the Algiers peace negotiations have been criticised by human rights 
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groups for failing to adequately address possible war crimes committed 
by all parties to the conflict.75   
While the Malian authorities have conducted investigations into the 
disappearance and executions of the elite ‘berets rouges’ by forces loyal 
to Amadou Sanogo, there have been no formal justice procedures for 
the numerous victims of other abuses during the conflict. The sexual 
abuse of women and girls in northern Mali has been documented by 
various human rights groups. In 2014 women’s NGOs deposed a formal 
complaint at commune III on behalf of 80 women who had been raped 
in the north during the crisis.76 This has led human rights observers to 
criticize the negligeance on the part of the government and judicial 
authorities.  
The formal justice system suffers from the same pervasive problem of 
corruption as found in the police, but to an even greater extent in the 
eyes of the Malian public. 78.4% of Malians consider the justice sector 
to be the public institution that is most affected by bad governance 
(higher than even perceptions of bad governance of the police which 
stands at 75 %).77 While a high cost of entry is imposed on aspiring 
members of the judicial cadres (estimated currently at around $10,000 
USD by one interviewee), the members of the justice system are then 
able to levy fees and solicit bribes from the users of the system, who are 
equally aware that the system functions on the basis of bribes.78 
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 Challenges to effective SSR 
Challenges to effective SSR specific to Mali result from the complexity 
of its crisis and the range of actors involved. The context of SSR in Mali 
is complex, raising particular challenges for SSR in Mali. The security 
sector is directly affected by three overlapping conflicts: first, the dec-
ades-old conflict between Bamako and the north of the country based 
on northern marginalisation and privation, with northern groups peri-
odically rebelling and seeking greater autonomy or, increasingly, se-
cession. Second, within the north there are inter-communal rivalries 
and conflicts among the various groups, vying for survival, access to 
resources, prestige and power.79 The third conflict is the confrontation 
between international actors and international terrorist groups who are 
operating in and through expanses of the north in which the Malian 
state is largely absent. Each of these three conflicts affects the security 
apparatus and its governance, as well as the nature of international 
assistance that is provided to Mali for the reform of its security sector.  
The north-south conflict raises issues of governance, inclusiveness 
of state institutions and the equitable provision of public goods and 
services, including safety, security and justice throughout all of Mali. 
SSR encompasses broader issues of governance of the delivery of the 
public goods and is deeply political in its implications and effects, 
which in combination with the complexity of its context, will pose con-
siderable challenges to undertake effectively. Inter-communal tensions 
and rivalries have been influenced and exploited in the past by the 
Bamako’s practice of outsourcing northern security to local militias. 
Western powers, in their focus on combatting Jihadist groups and 
cross-border trafficking, tend to reduce the complexities of northern 
Mali and focus on train and equip activities.  
Current reform initiatives in Mali’s security and justice sectors are 
being supported by various international donors and partners, who 
focus on capacity building, rehabilitation of infrastructure (offices and 
buildings), and training of personnel in justice, police, corrections, 
army, and border services. These efforts do not yet amount to a holistic 
SSR process. MINUSMA, which is mandated to support the rebuilding 
of the Malian security sector,80 is engaging with the Malian government 
                                                          
79  Kalilou Sidibé, ‘Security Management in Northern Mali: Criminal Networks and 
Conflict Resolution Mechanisms’, IDS Research Report 77 (August 2012), p. 25.  
80  As per Security Council Resolution 2164 (2014), para 13(c) (ii), MINUSMA is man-
dated ‘to support national, and to coordinate international, efforts towards rebuild-
ing the Malian security sector, especially the police and gendarmerie through tech-
nical assistance, capacity-building, co-location and mentoring programmes, as well 
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to help develop a holistic programme in SSR. A reflection group on SSR 
has been established and a reflection process resulted in a report on 
how the Malian SSR process should be handled. One of its recommen-
dations was to create a national council on SSR (conseil nationale pour 
la réforme du secteur de la sécurité or CRSS). The CRSS was created by 
the government in August 2014, with responsibility for defining the 
strategic guidelines and identify national priorities in SSR; deciding on 
corrective measures in the course of SSR; validating budgets proposed 
by the reform coordination cell; mobilising resources needed for the 
reform; and ensuring the effective implementation of the reform pro-
cess.81 In addition to this strategic level guidance, a permanent tech-
nical commission on SSR was envisioned as a secretariat, and estab-
lished by presidential decree, but its members have not yet been ap-
pointed. This will be activated once a peace agreement is endorsed, and 
it is likely that the armed groups will be represented on the CRSS coun-
cil.82  
Underlining MINUSMA’s lead role in coordinating international 
support to SSR is the creation of the Strategic Committee on SSR and 
DDR. This Strategic Committee is a coordinating structure that brings 
bilateral and multilateral partners to the table on DDR and SSR initia-
tives, and is chaired by the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General (SRSG) or his deputy. This functions as the counterpart of the 
CRSS.  
However, while MINUSMA has been mandated with leading coordi-
nation on SSR, it is a recent arrival in Mali, where coordination mecha-
nisms were already in place for international donors working in the 
spheres of security and justice, including structures for coordinating 
technical and financial partners of Mali. One such pre-existing struc-
ture exists for example on internal security and justice, and continues 
to meet. Along with such pre-existing arrangements, MINUSMA shares 
a crowded field with newer arrivals. The EU Training Mission in Mali 
(EUTM) and EUCAP Sahel Mali were, like MINUSMA, established after 
the 2012-13 crisis and represent EU-led capacity-building initiatives 
for, respectively, Mali’s armed forces and internal security forces. While 
recognising MINUSMA’s role in coordinating international support to 
SSR, Bamako will continue with such cooperative mechanisms in in-
ternational security.  
                                                          
as the rule of law and justice sectors, within its capacities, and in close collabora-
tion with other bilateral partners, donors, and international organizations, includ-
ing the EU, engaged in these fields, including through enhancing information shar-
ing and joint strategic planning among all actors’. 
81  Réforme du secteur de la sécurité au Mali, Pana, 28 August 2014, 
http://maliactu.net/reforme-du-secteur-de-la-securite-au-mali/, accessed 11 April 
2015.  
82  Confidential interview, Bamako, 25 February 2015.  
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In the wake of the crisis and the acknowledged risk of instability and 
jihadi activity across the Sahel, Mali is the recipient of ongoing security 
cooperation and assistance Given the prominent role of intra- and inter-
community rivalries in previous conflicts in Mali, any effort to provide 
security assistance to local actors, particularly in northern Mali, must 
strive to understand how such infusions of resources and training will 
impact on relations among the groups.83 Moreover, while the EU, MI-
NUSMA and bilateral donors have been providing training and capaci-
ty-building for Mali’s armed and security forces, a focus on technical 
assistance alone will not be sufficient to transform the dysfunctional 
Malian armed forces, which require deep structural reforms that target 
the organizational culture, professionalism, and leadership of the ar-
my. Indeed past technical assistance contributed to the problems of 
Mali’s armed forces today. For example, shortly after the French inter-
vention, US General Carter Ham, Head of US Africa Command, admit-
ted that past US military training and security assistance to Mali had 
focused on tactics, strategy and technical matters, and had failed to 
instil values or the military professional ethos.84 US security assistance 
from 2005-2011 under the auspices of the regional Trans-Saharan 
Counterterrorism Initiative focused on training a small number of elite 
tactical units, and the provision of vehicles and communications 
equipment, leaving the regular Malian military undertrained and un-
derequipped for conventional war.85 
Interviews conducted in Bamako suggest that MINUSMA’s image in 
Mali needs to be carefully managed. According to one Bamako-based 
governance expert, when MINUSMA first arrived there was some anxie-
ty among the public and a wait and see attitude. This mixed response 
was reflected in public opinion polls results in early 2014 showing 
48.8% of Mali’s population viewing MINUSMA’s presence in the coun-
try as clearly positive, while 47.2% saw it as ‘somewhat positive’, nega-
tive or very negative.86 Moreover a strong majority of Malians preferred 
a relatively short engagement by MINUSMA and Barkhane, with 70% in 
favour of their presence in the country lasting only 1-2 years after the 
signing of a peace accord with the armed groups.87 The mission was 
perceived by some Malians as a foreign body in the country, whose 
presence was opposed from what some have called the sense of nation-
al pride. Once the mission began to operate it became evident that most 
of the peacekeeping forces were based in the south while the problems 
were in the north. MINUSMA was also perceived to be colluding with 
                                                          
83  Stephanie Pezard and Michael Shurkin, ‘Toward a Secure and Stable Northern Mali: 
Approaches to Engaging Local Actors’, RAND, RR-296-OSD, 2013, p. 10.  
84  Carter Ham, ‘Is America Training Too Many Foreign Armies?, Foreign Policy, 28 
January 2013.  
85  Joshua Hammer, ‘When the Jihad Came to Mali’, New York Review of Books, 19 Feb-
ruary 2013.  
86  Mali-Mètre, 2014, p. 52.  
87  Mali-Mètre, 2014, p. 54.  
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the MNLA at one point, leading to the demonstrations in Gao that re-
sulted in several deaths. While MINUSMA is acknowledged as provid-
ing a certain stability and reassuring presence, its mandate and role are 
not well understood by Malian society. Despite having ‘stabilization’ in 
its name, civil society actors do not yet perceive it as playing a stabiliz-
ing role. Further, MINUSMA appears to have entered into a competitive 
relation with other regional actors and partners, and the rationale and 
means by which it will assume a leadership role, including vis-à-vis 
Mali’s traditional main development actors, is unclear to some Malian 
civil society actors. Moreover, while some Malians acknowledge the 
added value of the peacekeeping mission’s presence, others perceive 
that most peacekeepers are only motivated by the compensation they 
receive for being deployed on the international mission. 
 Conclusion 
Effective SSR – finding a way for all of Mali’s citizens to benefit from 
safety, security and access to justice – is not going to be straight-
forward or easily achieved. Passage of the new LOPM is but one neces-
sary step in a long process, a process that is inextricably tied to the en-
dorsement of a credible peace agreement. In addition to new laws, re-
vised policies and appropriate budgets, Mali must endeavour to trans-
form the organizational culture within its security sector, to build in-
tegrity and an apolitical, professional ethos. As described above, there 
are multiple, interacting tensions concerning the composition of securi-
ty institutions, such as integration of former rebels, inclusiveness in the 
state security apparatus, and responsiveness to local needs and con-
cerns, which in the northern part of the country may mean security 
institutions composed largely of northerners. Within the institutions 
themselves issues that need to be addressed include improving internal 
discipline, strengthening civilian authority over the military and the 
police, fostering more effective management including the promotion 
of officers on the basis of merit, enhancing professionalism, combating 
corruption and building integrity, and dealing with the political divi-
sions and rival factions within both the military and police. Vetting of 
the defence and security forces to remove perpetrators of human rights 
abuses, and to prevent such individuals from being integrated into the 
security sector, will also be necessary to repair the integrity of the ser-
vices. While Mali is the recipient of international assistance in the form 
of funding, capacity-building and training in targeted areas, these ac-
tivities must be balanced with the root-and-branch reform of the securi-
ty sector and should form part of a long-term process for the establish-
ment of an effective, professional and accountable security sector that 
serves all Malians. 
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